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Abstract: In the Czech Republic, military elites find it very difficult to persuade politicians and the public that they should spend more on 
defence, which is in agreement with the predictions of the theory. The decreasing willingness of the public to serve in the army is 
indicated, among others, by the growing numbers of those who choose to go into so called civilian service introduced as an 
alternative to military service in the period of the Federation. The gradual evolution towards the cadre-based army is to be 
understood in the context of new priorities in terms of the basic tasks the army is expected to fulfil. The way of the Czech 
Armed Forces (ACR) modernizing has been in agreement with the political strategy of building a reduced, modern army that, 
while designed primarily for the defence of the state territory, would also be ready to use part of its capacities to carry out various 
types of peace resolution operations. On the whole, we can conclude that the basic trends in the ACR modernization are 
basically in agreement with the main trends of the ongoing revolution in military affairs, provided, of course, one allows for the 
limitations of the Czech Republic (CR) financial resources.   
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1. Tendencies in the development of armies in the Euro-American civilisation circle  
The 15 years that have passed since the breakdown of the bipolar world order have 
brought considerable changes affecting also the issues of international, security, and military 
policies.  The theoretical concepts required for the explanation of these changes have been 
elaborated by many authors, e.g. Ch. Moskos, Ch. Dandeker, K. H. Haltiner, W. Bredow, A. a A. 
and E. Toffler.  To summarise their theoretical assumptions, we can say that the trends in 
question are characterised by:  
1. Relative deterioration in the position of the armed forces within the society. This is 
manifested in such phenomena as the decreasing ability of the army institution to 
compete with other social groups and institutions for social resources, growing 
unwillingness of citizens to serve in the army, and the increasing pressure exerted on the 
political representation by the society at large demanding the introduction of various 
liberal rules enabling citizens to avoid military service. On the other hand, one can say 
that most people tend to respect the army, provided they are not forced to serve in it.  
Thus, from the theoretical point of view, it can be expected that the Czech Armed Forces 
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(ACR) reform will be accompanied by falling defence expenditures, unwillingness of the 
society to allocate financial resources to defence, and increasing recruitment problems. 
2. Decreasing size of armed forces and the transition from mass conscription armies to 
professional armies, accompanied by structural changes aimed at the relative increase of 
those army components that are capable to serve outside home territory and provide for 
the whole spectrum of crisis management operations in which the army carries out, in 
words of Ch. Moskos, “police functions”. The theory predicts that the ACR reform will 
be associated with the downsizing of the armed forces, transition to professional army, 
relative growth of forces capable of operating outside the territory of the Czech Republic, 
and placing emphasis on new tasks of the armed forces. 
3. Modernisation of weaponry necessitated by the ongoing revolution in military affairs 
oriented to automated systems of command, communication systems, strategic 
reconnaissance, strategic mobility, warfare based on high precision ammunition being 
controlled form positions beyond the reach of the enemy, protection against weapons of 
mass destruction, and radical increase in the capability of both military hardware and 
soldiers to survive in the conditions of modern battlefield.  The main objective is to 
obtain the capacity to launch precise strikes minimizing collateral damage, ever increasing 
attention being paid to non-lethal weapons. Thus, it can be expected that the process of 
modernisation within the ACR reform will be associated with the orientation to the above 
given areas and the decline of the traditional orientation to intensive warfare in the 
Central European battlefield.  
  
2 Tendencies in the development of the ACR in the 1990s 
 
2.1 Defence expenditures and armed forces recruitment capability 
 Theoretical concepts of the evolution of civil-military relations lead to the prediction that 
the ACR will have to face the problem of falling defence expenditures combined with the 
decreasing willingness of Czech citizens to serve in the military. The actual evolution of defence 
expenditures in what is now the Czech Republic after 1989 does not in any way contradict the 
theoretical prediction. The MoD expenditures in the period in question oscillated around the 
figure of approximately 2 % GDP. This is about 50 % of the expenditures that used to be 
allocated to defence in the period of the Cold War socialist Czechoslovakia.  With its current 
defence expenditures the Czech Republic oscillates around the average of NATO countries. 
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Thus, since its expenditures has been so radically reduced compared to recent past, the ACR 
cannot in an way be blamed for the deteriorating state of public finance in the Czech Republic.   
In spite of the above-described facts, there has been a tendency to regard the MoD 
budget almost automatically as a possible source for savings in all annual budgetary discussions. 
We do not have enough space here for a detailed analysis of budgetary discussions taking place in 
parliamentary sessions (open to the public). Nevertheless, there is one general feature in all these 
debates that forms an annually repeated pattern: there have always been some politicians (across 
the political spectrum) who have sought, through emendations, to reallocate parts of the MoD 
budget to other purposes.  Even though the proposed amendments have rarely been pushed 
through successfully, they have made military planning difficult, bringing into it an undesirable 
element of uncertainty. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the politicians in question, such 
behaviour can be regarded as a rational vote-maximising strategy, because, in general, it is widely 
supported by the Czech public.  According to CIV (Centre for Information Research) data, in the 
period 1996 – 2002, the percentage of citizens believing that defence expenditures were an 
unjustified burden on the government budget ranged from 46 % (in 1998) to 58 % (in 2002). 
(Jandová – Pavlíková 2003: 16) In agreement with these attitudes of the Czech public, defence 
expenditures were reduced to the level of 1,9 % GDP shortly after the Army reform had been 
started. This had a negative impact on the progress of the reform, and was one of the reasons for 
its subsequent review. In the Czech Republic, military elites find it very difficult to persuade 
politicians and the public that they should spend more on defence, which is in agreement with 
the predictions of the theory.  
The decreasing willingness of the public to serve in the army is indicated, among others, 
by the growing numbers of those who choose to go into so called civilian service introduced as 
an alternative to military service in the period of the Federation. The conditions one must meet 
to avoid military service have been formulated very loosely in the Czech Republic, which, again, 
is in agreement with predictions of the theory. According to the data of the Ministry of Work and 
Social Affairs, on March 3 2004, 39 940 persons were registered as liable to military service.1 The 
number of persons choosing civilian service grew until 1999 when it amounted to 15 608 
(compared to 8 202 persons in 1993). Then the number began to decrease slowly, reaching 
1 The End of Civilian Service. (Konec civilní služby.) Press Release of the CR Ministry of Work and Social Affairs 
(Tisková zpráva MPSV ČR)  June 2 2004. 
 278
Středoevropské politické studie  roč. VI, č. 2-3, s. 276-289 
Central European Political Studies Review  Vol. VI, Number 2-3, pp. 276-289 
Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity v Brně  ISSN 1212-7817 
 
 
                                                          
11 414 in 2002,2 which is probably to be accounted for by demographic processes and by the fact 
that many of those who wanted to avoid military service began to pursue an alternative strategy - 
to be exempt from military service on health grounds. Even though the process of the 
professionalisation of the Czech Army does not face recruitment problems, the majority of 
Czech citizens are not ready to go in their support of the military to the length of serving in it. 
The research of Markent Limited Liability Company conducted in November and December 
2003 showed that 85 % respondents were in favour of steps leading to the Czech army 
professionalisation3, the figure exceeding 90 % in the age group up to 30 years,  (Jandová – 
Pavlíková 2003: 30). One possible interpretation of the data is that 85 % of the respondents are 
not ready to serve in the military. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that only 20 % 
citizens are interested in serving in paid reserves. (Jandová-Pavlíková 2003: 33) Given these 
attitudes of the public towards military service, how is it possible that the army does not have 
problems with recruitment? This, as I believe, can be explained by the combined effect of the 
following factors: 1. The target size of the Czech Army has been set at a relatively low number 
(only 0,26 % of total population compared to 1,33 % in 1989, and 0,9 % in 1993), which means 
that it is not necessary to recruit too many citizens.; 2. The unemployment in the Czech Republic 
is relatively high. Since the Social Democratic government came to power, the unemployment has 
doubled, and has been oscillating around 10 % for some time now; 3. Military service is a well-
paid profession with social benefits high above the average in the remaining society. This 
situation is a result of successful efforts and pressures exerted by Czech military elites in the 
second half of the 1990s, the period in which the Social Democrats participated in the 
government; 4. The participation of Czech armed forces in military operations abroad has so far 
been connected with only small casualties. That is why the situation in the area of recruitment in 
the Czech Republic can be interpreted in ways that bring it in agreement with predictions of the 
theory, and does not have to be taken as its falsifying instance. The fact that, so far, the Czech 
Army has not had problems with recruitment, is to be explained be the coincidence of the above 
described factors, rather then by the desire of Czech citizens to serve their country in arms. If the 
ACR had to recruit the customary 0,4 – 0,5% of total population (which it neither want to do, 
nor can - for lack of financial resources), it certainly would begin to experience recruitment 
2 Civilian Service after the Army Professionalization. (Civilní služba po profesionalizaci armády.) Press Release of the 
CR Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (Tisková zpráva MPSV ČR) May 22 2003.  
3 Public Opinion about the Armed Forces Reform. March 4 2004 (Veřejné mínění o reformě ozbrojených sil. 
4.3.2004)  http://www.army.cz.  
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problems. If such current parameters as the low target size of the ACR, high salaries and social 
benefits of military personnel, and high unemployment rates are kept constant, we can only 
expect the ACR to start having recruitment problems if its suffers relatively high casualties in 
overseas operations. This, of course, may happen in the future.         
 
2.2 Development of the Size and tasks of the ACR 
 The size of the Czech Armed Forces has been decreasing throughout the 1990s. While in 
1993 the Czech Army had 92,599 soldiers, it had only 30,470 soldiers in 2004, and its target size 
is planned to be 26,200 soldiers after the completion of the reform, which is only 28 % of its 
original size.4 This development, combined together with the decision (agreed upon by basically 
all Czech parliamentary political parties) allows us to conclude that, in the 1990s, the Czech 
society took important steps away from a mass-based army, and towards a cadre-based army. The 
crucial step on the way to the completion of this transition is the decision that compulsory 
military service be abolished as off December 31 2004.  After that decision comes in force, the 
Czech Army will no longer have, in times of crises, the recourse to the draft of large numbers of 
reserves, who would be at least partially trained. If a sudden need arises to augment its numbers, 
the army will have to manage with drawing on voluntary reserves or former career soldiers. 
This gradual evolution towards the cadre-based army is to be understood in the context 
of new priorities in terms of the basic tasks the army is expected to fulfil. Nevertheless, the shift 
form the classic tasks of the army, characteristic of the Cold War period, towards the tasks of 
policing, as they are predicted by Moskos, is by far not so definite and unequivocal, as some 
authors believe. Even though the foreign policy ambitions associated with the plans prepared 
within the Warsaw Pact - plans that, until as late as the second half of the 1980s, envisioned 
offensive operations against NATO forces - were abandoned already at period of the CSFR, the 
build-up of the Czech Armed Forces remained to be predicated on territorial defence being its 
primary task. In 1993 the government accepted “The Concept of the Army Build-up until 1996” 
(in further text referred to as “Build-up Concept 1993”) which reflected new priorities of the CR 
security policy. Build-up Concept 93 assumes that a local conflict with limited objectives, caused 
by disputes over exiting national borders or by nationalistic extremism, is the most likely form of 
4 Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. (1994).  Army Yearbook 1993, and   Ministry of Defence of the Czech 
Republic. (2003). The Concept of the Professional Army CR build-up and Armed Forces CR Mobilisation, Adapted 
to the Changed Resource Framework (Koncepce výstavby profesionální Armády České republiky a mobilizace 
ozbrojených sil České republiky přepracovaná na změněný zdrojový rámec.). A-revue, n. 24. pg. 6.   
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military threat. It regards a regional conflict as less probable.5 Like the federal army, the newly 
built CR Army was designed for the defence of the territory of the state against potential 
aggression coming from any direction. Build-up Concept 93 defined 9 tasks of the ACR: „1. to 
provide a credible deterrent that, while not  posing a threat to neighbours,  will deter any potential aggressor  by 
making it impossible to attack the CR with impunity; 2. to be ready to repulse any ground or air attack coming to 
any part of the Czech Republic from any direction; 3. To provide for the defence and protection of the population 
and buildings or facilities on the whole territory of the CR that are necessary for the functioning of the state; 4. To 
be ready, in compliance with cooperation agreements with the Ministry of the Interior, to assist in dealing with 
security problems that cannot be dealt with effectively by security forces of the Ministry of the Interior alone; 5. To 
be preparing for prospective accession to NATO and Western European Union; 6. To participate in peaceful 
resolution of conflicts and civilisation problems of international significance within NATO forces, or, as the case 
might be, within the frame of building the international security system; 7. To acquire the character and position of 
a democratic society army; 8. To meet international obligations; 9. To use efficiently resources allocated to defence."6 
Similarly, the first „Military Strategy" of the independent Czech state says that “the Czech 
Republic and its army, making use of the available international structures and allies, must be 
ready to resist any attack by enemy of any strength, coming from any direction, and taking place 
under all conditions, irrespective of how the war is started and what kind of warfare is used."7 
Even though the army was gradually engaged in various peace resolution operations, and its 
capacities began to be adapted to the new tasks, it still remained to be built predominantly as a 
territorial defence army, and the preparation for the task outside the state territory were only left 
to its residual capacities. After 1995 the Military Strategy assumes that what will happen “In 1996 
- 2005, will essentially be just a completion of the transformation of the present army to the army which, because of 
its high quality and despite its smaller size, will have a sufficient combat capability to provide a credible defence of 
the Czech Republic. It will also meet the military criteria for the interoperability with NATO and WEU, and for 
the accession to these organisations.“8 Even though much had been achieved in the process of the ACR 
transformation, the Government noted on March 26 1997, when discussing “The Plan of the 
5 CR Ministry of Defence. (1993). ACR Build-up Concept until 1996.  (Koncepce výstavby Armády České republiky 
do roku 1996.)  Military Review  (Vojenské rozhledy) 7/1993, pg. 7. 
6 CR Ministry of Defence. (1993). ACR Build-up Concept until 1996.  (Koncepce výstavby Armády České republiky 
do roku 1996.)  Military Review (Vojenské rozhledy), n. 7, pg. 5. 
7 CR Ministry of Defence (1996). Military Strategy of the Czech Republic. (Vojenská strategie České republiky.) 
Military Review (Vojenské rozhledy) n. 2, p. 5. 
8 CR Ministry of Defence (1996). Military Strategy of the Czech Republic. (Vojenská strategie České republiky.) 
Military Review (Vojenské rozhledy) n. 2, p. 5. pg. 8. 
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ACR build-up until 2000, with the prospect to 2006”: “Objectives that have been dictated by the 
basic documents accepted by the CR (National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy) have not been 
met. Nor has the ACR been able to respond in a flexible way to the changed volume of the financial resources 
allocated to it. Even though the Army has been able to maintain its essential capability to defend the country 
without external assistance, it is neither ready nor properly equipped for the more demanding tasks implied by the 
anticipated character of potential threats. Besides, the capacity of the ACR to receive, as the case might be, an 
assistance from its allies is very limited … The ability of the Czech Republic to achieve its goals has continually 
been falling."9  
This bad condition of the Army, which had not been up to the needs of the Czech 
security policy in the new security environment in terms of either its structure, size or main tasks, 
led, after debates in which both politicians and members of the Czech security community took 
part, and after some intermediate steps, to a crucial political decision. The government of the 
Czech Republic decided to start the preparation of a radical reform of the ACR, and it set up the 
institute of the Trustee for the Preparation of the Radical Reform of the Armed Forces of the 
CR.10 Gen. Škopka was nominated as the government trustee. A teem of 14 people was created 
that prepared the “Analysis of definitions, required capabilities, target structure and composition 
of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.“ The government acknowledged the document. It 
further discussed and accepted another document under the title “The Reform of the Armed 
Forces - the Goals and Principles”. Subsequently, the government decided that two concepts 
should be prepared by the end of March 2002: “The Concept of the Build-up of the Professional 
Army of the Czech Republic” and “The Concept of the Mobilisation of the Armed Forces of the 
Czech Republic”.  The definition of the goals assigned to the military by the political 
representation had to respect the following parameters: 1. Providing for the defence of vital and 
strategic interests of the Czech Republic; 2. Meeting NATO membership commitments; 3. 
Keeping defence spending at the level of 2.2 % GDP until 2004 ; Demographic trends and falling 
numbers of young people conscripted to the army.11 It was originally assumed that conscription 
would be preserved until full professionalization is achieved. In 2002, the final size of the future 
professional army was set at 34,000 - 36,000 soldiers and 10,000 civil employees. It was also 
9 Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic (1997). The Plan of the ACR build-up until 2000, with the prospect to 
2005 (Záměr koncepce výstavby AČR do roku 2000 s výhledem do roku 2005.) Abbreviated version not containing 
classified information. Military Review (Vojenské rozhledy), n. 2, pg. 13. 
10 CR Government Resolution n. 489, May 14 2001. 
11 Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic  (2002). Yerbook 2001. Prague,  pg. 30 – 31. 
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decided that the allocation of resources to defence should respect the minimal level of 2.2 % 
GDP.  
The 2003 ACR review, necessitated by the MoD budget reductions, decreased the 
planned target size of the Army to 26,200 soldiers and 8,000 civil employees. It stated the 
intention that, after the completion of the reform, in 2010 - 2010, the ACR should be capable of: 
1. Deploying all its forces in an operation of collective defence by article 5 of Washington 
Treaty; 
2. Deploying up to 3 000 troops in one peace enforcement operation for the period of 6 
month without rotation (by 2007), or an air force element equivalent to it in terms of 
resource requirements, for the maximum period of 3 months without rotation (after 
2010); 
3. Deploying up to 1 000 troops for the period of 6 month without rotation in one peace 
support or peace keeping operation or an air force element equivalent, while keeping 250 
troops for the purpose of a simultaneous operation for the period of 6 months without 
rotation. 
 
At the same time, in parallel with any of the above given variants of the deployment of its 
forces, the Czech Armed Forces should be able to provide for the protection of important 
buildings or facilities, and, as the case might be, to receive NATO reinforcements at the territory 
of the Czech Republic and to participate in NATINEADS (NATO Integrated Extended Air 
Defence System).12
Nevertheless, not even the tasks defined as described above can in any way be regarded as 
implying the build-up of an army designed for a range of types of military peace resolution 
operations outside the territory of the Czech Republic. One of the emphases of the current 
concept of the ACR reform still is to maintain complex military capabilities (however reduced in 
comparison with the Cold War period) aimed at a self-reliant defence of the territory of the state. 
But, if we take into account the current international security environment characterised by the 
absence of an enemy threatening the territory of the Czech Republic with a classic form of 
military aggression, the ongoing process of the reduction of the ACR, and the fact that the ACR 
12 Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. (2003) The Concept of the Professional Army CR build-up and 
Armed Forces CR Mobilisation, Adapted to the Changed Resource Framework. (Koncepce výstavby profesionální 
Armády České republiky a mobilizace ozbrojených sil České republiky přepracovaná na změněný zdrojový rámec.) 
A-report, n. 24, pg.. 7. 
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has stopped to build massive reserves, then, in the view of the author of this paper, it is obvious 
that the orientation of the ACR in the first decade of the 21st century is much more towards the 
acquiring the capability to carry out a range of peace resolving operations, than it ever was during 
the 1990s. Thus, as the author believes, the theoretical assumption of the growing importance of 
the tasks of armies is more or less confirmed in the specific case of the Czech Republic, even 
though the process is probably not so fast and forthright, as was originally supposed.   
 
2.3 ACR Modernization 
 The ACR inherited from the Federal armed forces a large quantum of heavy military 
hardware that was of little use in the changed military environment. On the other hand, it lacked 
other types of military equipment. Most of the equipment inherited form the Federal army was 
obsolete and in bad condition, and, therefore, it was clear that it would have to be 
decommissioned. But the rest, if updated and made interoperable within NATO, could still be 
maintained. Thus, there were two processes taking place in parallel: 1. Downsizing, especially by 
cutting down on heavy military hardware, 2. Modernization and acquisition of new equipment 
with the aim to gradually remove the weakest spots of the ACR. While in January 1 1993 the 
ACR had 957 tanks, 1367 armoured carriers and combat infantry vehicles, 767 pieces of artillery 
and rocket launchers, and 456 aircraft13, it is expected that after the completion of the reform it 
will have about 150 tanks, at most 1000 combat infantry vehicles or armoured carriers, and 
around 100 combat aircraft and helicopters. Radical reductions are also expected in artillery 
equipment.   
However much were the 1990s characterised by the absence of any rational and 
consistent armament concept that would be based on a consistent security strategy (such strategy 
was created the first time as late 1999), it can be argued that throughout the whole period in 
question the emphasis was on the modernisation of the ACR through acquiring a limited number 
of highly modern weapon systems either by means of the modernisation of the equipment the 
army already had (T-72) or through the purchase of new equipment (L-159, Gripen, armoured 
carriers). This strategy was, and still is, hampered by four obstacles: 1. Insufficiently worked out 
processes of Planning, Programming and Budgeting, which led and still leads to enormous 
economic losses; 2. Insufficient financial backing of these processes; 3. Inadequacy of many of 
the programmes with respect to the need of the state to provide for the capability of the ACR to 
carry out various types of crisis management operations; 4. Considerable influence of interest-
13 Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic (1994). Army Yerbook 1993. 
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groups associated with the ACR forcing Czech political elites to take into account the interests of 
the Czech industrial-military complex in modernisation programmes. Throughout the whole 
period of the 1990s the firms of the Czech military-industrial complex were complaining that 
their value as contractors was underestimated by the Czech military, which situation was 
damaging to their image abroad, and this, in turn, made it difficult for them to enter foreign 
markets controlled by international producers and protected by national governments, and 
characterised by a big surplus of supply over demand. As opposed to this, I believe that some of 
the programmes were only launched to achieve certain industrial policy objectives or to create job 
opportunities, rather than to meet real needs of the ACR. In this context, we should mention 
especially such programmes as the acquisition of 72 aircraft L –159 Alca, the modernization (that 
was eventually stopped) of Mig-21, and up to an extent, also the modernisation of tank T-72. 
 This way of the ACR modernizing was in agreement with the political strategy of building 
a reduced, modern army that, while designed primarily for the defence of the state territory, 
would also be ready to use part of its capacities to carry out various types of peace resolution 
operations. Even though the reworked concept of the army reform puts more emphasis on the 
capability to carry out peace resolution operations, it is not a radical departure from the above 
strategy. This is indicated by the intention to buy the supersonic multipurpose aircraft, the 
acquisition of T-72M4CZ tanks, modernization of helicopters, acquisition of new armoured 
carriers, and some other projects.14 On the other hand, compared to the past, there is now more 
emphasis on the ACR being specialised in the area of passive monitoring systems and equipment 
for dealing with after-effects of the use of mass destruction weapons. Last but not least, there is 
also an emphasis on introducing information and logistic systems into all parts of the ACR. 
According to the security policy of the Czech Republic the ACR should remain a balanced force 
that will maintain all its vital components, even though, compared to the Czechoslovak People’s 
Army of the Cold War Period, it will be downsized by an order of magnitude both in terms of its 
manpower and heavy military hardware, which is a prospect that is disliked by part of the officer 
corps.  
 
 
14 Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic (2003) The Concept of the Professional Army CR build-up and Armed 
Forces CR Mobilisation, Adapted to the Changed Resource Framework (Koncepce výstavby profesionální Armády 
České republiky a mobilizace ozbrojených sil České republiky přepracovaná na změněný zdrojový rámec). A-report, 
n. 24. 
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3. Conclusion 
The defence expenditure has been radically reduced in the Czech Republic since 1989, 
now being kept around at the level of 2 % GDP, which is approximately the NATO average. 
Given the priorities of the Czech society, the defence expenditure is unlikely to grow in the 
future, and it may even be slightly further reduced. Currently, the ACR is undergoing a process or 
professionalization which is by and large supported by the Czech public. Due to the relatively low 
target size of its manpower (0,265 % of total population), relative high long-term unemployment 
rates (around 10 %), and relatively high salaries of military personnel in connection with social 
benefits high above the standard level in the rest of the society, the ACR does not experience any 
recruitment problems for the time being. The Army has been radically downsized, and, after the 
reform is completed, its manpower should be about 25 % of its 1993 size. As for the ACR tasks, 
even though the defence of the state territory against aggression has remained its primary task, 
since the 1990s there has also been a growing tendency towards strengthening the ACR 
capabilities in the area of overseas peace resolution operations. On the whole, we can conclude 
that the basic trends in the ACR modernization, in spite of some problems of organizational 
nature, are basically in agreement with theoretical predictions and with the main trends of the 
ongoing revolution in military affairs, provided, of course, one allows for the limitations of the 
CR financial resources.  Similarly, the development of the ACR and the development of its 
position within the democratic society are also in agreement with general trends. All that, as I 
believe, indicates that the Czech society is gradually becoming a consolidated democratic country.  
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